Energy security, which is generally defined - from the consumer's point of view - as access to adequate, affordable and reliable energy supplies, has become a matter of growing concern in Europe and North America in recent years. Most states in the Euro-Atlantic region are far from full energy independence, and rely on resources located abroad, often in faraway and unstable regions. They are therefore dependent on a series of external developments, some of which have recently indicated worrying trends.

The first of these is the evolution of the global energy market. Current projections indicate a trend towards an increasingly tense market in the coming decades, due, in particular, to a soaring demand in developing countries, which is expected to account for 74% of the overall increase in the global energy demand between 2005 and 2030. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that the global energy demand will increase by more than half by 2030 compared with 2005. Additionally, studies by the IEA confirm that the current course is not sustainable, given global objectives to reduce CO2 emissions.

Second, fears of a political use of energy resources by supplier states have also been revived by several recent events in the former Soviet Union. Third, there are indications of a growing threat of terrorist attacks on energy infrastructures, the effects of which would be felt worldwide. Tensions in the global energy market only increase the attractiveness of energy infrastructures to terrorists.

Because energy goes to the very core of a state's interests and survival, energy security is a vital issue for NATO Allies individually. At the Riga Summit in 2006, allied governments have also tasked NATO to consider its potential role in enhancing energy security collectively. The outcome of this reflection was examined at NATO's Bucharest Summit in April 2008, where Heads of State and Government agreed on a number of principles and fields for NATO's role in energy security.

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) certainly has a role to play in fostering reflections and discussions on NATO's potential role in enhancing energy security. Past initiatives include an excellent report presented by Jos van Gennip, (Netherlands), General Rapporteur of the Economics and Security Committee in 2006 [170 ESC 06 E rev. 1], and Resolution 354 of 2006 on "Improving Global Energy Security". This year, the Science and Technology Committee (STC), via its Sub-Committee on Energy and Environmental Security (STCEES), has taken the lead on this issue and will be discussing a report by Mario Tagarinski (Bulgaria) on "Energy Security for the Euro-Atlantic Region" [168 STCEES 08 E], which provides a comprehensive overview of the challenges and possible responses. Your Rapporteur would also like to mention the upcoming report by Vahit Erdem (Turkey), Rapporteur of the Mediterranean and Middle east Special Group (GSM), which will examine energy issues in the Mediterranean.

This report will focus on disruptions of the supply chain, which involve a physical attack against energy infrastructures through acts of terrorism and other forms of violence. These threats are addressed mainly through what is referred to as critical energy infrastructure protection (CEIP), that is policies which aim to reduce the vulnerabilities of the critical energy infrastructure in order to minimize the probability and potential impact of a successful attack. CEIP is a specific, but important, aspect of enhancing energy security. In fact, it is one of the tasks mentioned in NATO's Bucharest declaration.

The report will not examine disruptions connected to accidents and natural disasters. Nor will it consider disruptions resulting from decisions made by supplier states or companies which do not involve the use of violence, such as supply reduction or cut-off, price increases, embargoes, etc. Politically motivated energy supply disruptions are a real and serious concern, and several NATO nations - particularly those that are highly dependent on one gas supplier - consider that they pose a more direct and immediate challenge than physical attacks against energy infrastructure. However, your Rapporteur would like to draw a clear distinction between these two types of challenges. Addressing physical attacks against energy infrastructure requires entirely different policy tools than addressing the threat of politically motivated energy supply disruptions. This report was always intended to focus exclusively on the former. This is not to downplay the seriousness of other threats. Rather, this report is an attempt to bring some clarity into the discussion on energy security, which too often mixes together arguments relating to very distinct aspects of the question.1

This year's report will build on the special report on "The Protection of Critical Infrastructures" [162 CDS 07 E rev. 1], which your Rapporteur presented to the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security (CDS) in 2007, and which provided an overview of efforts undertaken by governments in Europe and North America to address the vulnerability of their infrastructure to acts of terrorism and other threats in a number of key sectors, including the energy sector.

The report first examines the nature of the challenge posed by terrorism and other violent acts to energy supplies in Europe and North America. It then examines the value of cooperative efforts in addressing this challenge. Overall, the report argues that the threat of attacks on the energy infrastructure is real and that there is a case for a greater role of NATO and the European Union in addressing it.

by Lord Jopling (United Kingdom)

NATO Parliamentary Assembly - November 2008

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