How will demographic changes influence the ground rules for security policy? Anyone wanting to gaze into the future is well advised to start with population data. Demographic projections are among the few sound assumptions social scientists can make about the future. Demographic shifts present policymakers with both potential and risks. Population developments will clearly have far-reaching implications for international security policy in decades to come.

Population developments are among the few relatively sound assumptions upon which we can base strategic planning for the future. After all, for people to have children in 20 or 25 years, they must be alive today. Life expectancies change slowly, so anyone who wants to look into the future is well advised to start with population data.

Those wanting to plan strategically must try to anticipate future developments in order to make timely preparations. Population pyramids and aging scenarios have become common across Germany and Europe. But we continue to regard demographic change primarily as a domestic problem related to pension planning, health reform, and labor market policy. What is overlooked is that national demographic changes are embedded in a global context in which international population structures will shift more radically than at the national level. A major danger lies in macro-observations or in concentrating on statistical averages.

The fact is, the world’s population is continuing to grow and is likely to reach at least 9.5 billion by 2050. However, regional trends will differ markedly. Whereas populations in many countries will triple, in others they will shrink by 15 percent. High-growth countries will have young populations, but for many others a decline in population will result in an aging process. While it is true that, from a global perspective, the astonishing expansion of the world’s population has so far been accompanied by an unprecedented increase in wealth and life expectancies, trends here also differ by region: while a number of countries boast living standards that far exceed the average, populations in others continue to live at subsistence levels, with life expectancies not unlike those in medieval Europe. A first point to make is that populations no longer play the same role for state power that they played in the period from the Napoleonic Wars to 1945, when mass armies drew on virtually inexhaustible supplies of “human material” to vanquish their opponents. Populations are certainly no longer seen as the foundation of mass warfare. Nor do they represent an inexhaustible pool of cheap proletarian labor. In all past periods of history, the burgeoning of state power was based on an expanding population.

A large, growing population was regarded as a key requirement for military and economic strength. But modern production processes and modern forms of conflict have made vast armies and the working masses a thing of the past. Training, technical superiority, information dominance, sound strategic analyses, and effective networks are more decisive today than purely quantitative factors. Nevertheless, all signs suggest that the great demographic upheaval expected in the next two generations will have far-reaching consequences for policy at the international level. One of the problems faced by aging European societies is that the recruitment pool for soldiers will grow smaller and competition for skilled workers will intensify. Furthermore, since the soldiers of the future will require greater technical and social skills, personnel costs for the military will increase substantially.

One consequence of the proximity between regions with high population growth and those with weak or negative growth will be differing perceptions of death and casualties. In societies where most families have only one child, deaths on the battlefield will be more costly in political terms than in societies where most women have several sons and may even be proud of sacrificing them as martyrs in battle. Israel is facing this dilemma today in its conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah. The difficulties of the United States in Iraq are also rooted in the fact that, although death rates represent less than two percent of the troops stationed there, America’s will to “stay the course” is clearly faltering. By contrast, Iraqi society is accepting an incredibly high price in blood without the same signs of fatigue. Demography is not a purely quantitative factor for state power. Whether a country has a large or a small population does not say a great deal about its wealth or its international power. Overpopulation is a problematic concept, and the English demographer Thomas Robert Malthus, in his mechanical determinism, surely failed to recognize many relevant points. Yet we can formulate some basic hypotheses. First, rapid, sustainable economic growth, particularly at the start of a modernization process and a technological revolution, is most often accompanied by sustainable population growth; the growing supply of fresh workers leads to extensive growth. And, secondly, the decisive factor is not population alone. Age composition and occupational qualifications of the population are every bit as important.

As a result of globalization, communication costs have fallen at a drastic rate throughout the world. Industrial production and financial services are becoming internationally mobile, as are images, information, and people themselves. Yet globalization has led not only to highly dynamic growth centers, but also to extensive regions in both the third world and developed countries that have no real access to this growth. Functioning social systems able to offset the effects of these divergent dynamics at both a regional and social level are becoming important stabilizing factors.

Demography can have consequences for security policy in relation to competitiveness and the pressures of migration. It can be a destabilizing force in societies that are being torn apart by the dynamics of uneven growth processes. It can create a new “proletariat” of young people who start life without any real future because they cannot find opportunities in the growth centers that are merging into global networks.

The figures (all in millions) speak volumes: At the end of World War II, population levels were as follows: Europe 350; the United States 180; Africa 100; India 400; China 400; the Soviet Union 200. The world had a total population of about three billion. Europe accounted for 12 percent of it, the United States 5 percent, Asia 35 percent, and Africa 3 percent. Today’s figures are: Europe 500; United States 300; Africa 900; India 1,100; China 1,300; and Russia 140. There are 6.5 billion people in the world. Eight percent of the world’s population lives in Europe, 4.5 percent in the United States, 60 percent in Asia and 14 percent in Africa. By the mid twenty-first century, we should see the following development: Europe 400; United States 420; Africa 1,900; India 1,600; China 1,500; Russia 120. The world will have about nine billion inhabitants, of whom 4.5 percent will live in Europe, 4.7 percent in the United States, 55 percent in Asia, and 22 percent in Africa. Even a cursory glance reveals that the US share of the total population will remain relatively constant, while Europe and Russia will account for a smaller part of the whole. Africa and India will make advances, while China will fall significantly behind after 2030.

Population developments in Europe and Africa are striking: whereas in 1945 Europe had four times as many inhabitants as Africa, just 100 years later, this ratio will be reversed. If we look at projections for South America and Mexico, a similar, though far less dramatic picture emerges for the United States: during this period, the ratio between the Anglo-American and the Latin American populations will shift from 1:1 to 1:2 (Latin America 1959, 170; 2050, 780). Europe and Russia, for their part, have shrinking populations and are adjacent to societies with extremely high growth rates. The picture is completed by the Arab region, which boasts some of the highest fertility rates in the world. Population shifts on the individual continents will be highly divergent. Spain and Italy will be the biggest losers in Europe, while France’s population will decline the least.

By 2050, South Africa, which has previously accounted  for over 60 percent of the added value produced on the African continent, will lose a fifth of its population (from 48 to 40 million, primarily due to AIDS). Botswana will virtually cease to exist (from 1.6 to 0.6 million, a 65 percent decline, with AIDS once again a principal factor). By contrast, countries that are already situated in areas of marginal subsistence agriculture (the Sahel zone) will see their populations triple over the next 50 years: from about 12 to 50 million in Mali, from 32 to about 120 million in Kenya, and from 53 to 200 million in the Congo. Figures from the Arab world are even more dramatic. Yemen—a country that consists primarily of mountains and desert without a single perennial river— had 2.5 million inhabitants in 1950. Its current population is 20 million, and in 2050 it is projected to have 80 million inhabitants. This will make it more populous than Germany. Today, 35 percent of the country’s inhabitants are unemployed and 45 percent live below the poverty line. The economy is growing at an annual rate of 2.4 percent, the population at 3.6 percent. The figures for Saudi Arabia are similar. The Saudi kingdom is expected to have 80 million inhabitants by 2050. When the state was founded by the current king’s father, the entire population probably numbered no more than one million. Saudi Arabia may generate the highest oil revenues in the world, but public debt is on the rise.

The future relationship between Europe and its neighbors in the south and southeast is also assuming clearer contour. Here a growing number of states with aging, shrinking populations and highly developed social security systems will exist alongside a growing number of young societies with rapidly growing populations and hopelessly inadequate social security systems. Europe can continue to expect moderate economic growth. In most of the adjacent countries, the impetus provided by economic growth, innovations, and investments will not keep up with population growth. Europe consists primarily of energy importers, while the regions on its southeastern borders are home to many of the largest energy exporters. This will create dependencies, divides, as well as push and pull factors. The oppressive scenes from Ceuta and Melilla last fall, as well as the constant flood of migrants attempting to reach Europe by sea, are probably the first rumblings of more severe, distant storms. This year alone over 30,000 migrants came ashore on Spain’s Canary Islands. We can only guess at how many died trying to make the crossing in inadequately equipped fishing boats.

Eight Questions for Security Policy

1. If new regions of the world grow into population heavyweights and we want international institutions to become more representative, the emerging players will rightly claim and be given greater international influence. Can we then be sure that these institutions, which are largely creations of the European- American tradition and based on its laws, norms and ordering principles, will maintain the same course? Will the representatives of other legal systems, with different ideas about justice, contractual freedom and civil liberties, gain greater sway in the future? Will the Chinese, Indians, Africans and Arabs introduce new ideas about human rights and distributive justice?

2. Innovation and a willingness to assume risk are likely to diminish in aging societies, which will place a premium on security and maintenance of the status quo. Aging societies will probably resist change, while younger societies will be more flexible and perhaps even revolutionary. What consequences will this have for the soft power of aging societies?

3. Demographic change is in itself value-neutral. However, for the first time in history, humanity is faced with an aging, shrinking population. As a rule, shrinking processes have always been associated with catastrophes—epidemics, environmental cataclysms, destruction, war, and conquests. The research seems to suggest that population growth is, in and of itself, a challenge, not a threat or menace. It only becomes a threat when it coincides with weak or eroding state power. Changes in the population require determined, anticipatory action by the state. If this is not forthcoming, the necessary adaptational processes could well be characterized by lawlessness, violence, and destruction. We cannot say that a large population is necessarily a boon or a burden. Nor can we say that a shrinking population will prove a society’s undoing. Much depends on whether policymakers succeed in cushioning the blow of imminent changes, on whether they not only react to, but channel forces through anticipatory and preventative measures. A prerequisite is that they examine the facts honestly, free of taboos and ideological thinking. For example, the clichéd claim that Germany is not a “land of immigration” has long obfuscated the fact that immigration has been a reality. The enduring focus on asylum seekers and refugees in immigration policy has led immigration to be regarded as a menacing flood that needs to be stopped or contained, or that can at best be tolerated. In combination with a strongly egalitarian ideology, the German focus on numbers alone has prevented policymakers from articulating the kind of individual immigration criteria that have long been a fact of life in traditional immigration countries like Canada and Australia.

4. The nature of migration is changing. The traditional immigrant of the nineteenth century left his or her life and belongings behind and whole-heartedly embraced a new future in an unknown land. Migrants today frequently encounter familiar infrastructures in the countries in which they settle. New York City’s legendary Chinatown is a prominent example but there are currently Turkish, Arab, Indian, Pakistani and Indonesian neighborhoods in many of the major European and American cities. Today’s immigrants remain in touch with their country of origin. Migration itself is reversible, travel costs are affordable, and roots in the old country are often not severed—fostering forms of “circular” migration. This naturally affects immigrants’ desire to assimilate in the guest country. Above all, it influences second and third generations. Migration must be grasped as a qualitative rather than a primarily quantitative problem. What is at stake is always an individual whose ability to integrate may differ significantly because of his or her cultural affinities, motivation and qualifications. Migration can be a highly positive factor provided it is controlled and follows clearly defined criteria.

5. Demographic shifts have far-reaching economic consequences. One consequence of decline is a shortage of skilled laborers. This will have a particularly powerful impact on Russia, Ukraine, and a few countries in Europe. After 2030 China will face an abrupt and severe aging problem that will dampen its current economic growth. An added complication is its lack of resilient public social security systems. India, by contrast, is likely to profit for a long time from the enormous potential of its well-trained young workforce. In African and Arab countries, in which population growth clearly exceeds economic growth and will continue to do so, a pool of restless young people who have few prospects within legal state structures will form. It is obvious that “alternative” ways of life will hold greater attraction for such individuals; they will drift into crime (often of the organized variety) or they will fall prey to metaphysical promises of salvation or even radical fundamentalism and terrorism. They may even turn to revolutionary violence. The situation is likely to be most volatile in societies in which the percentage of men is substantially higher than that of women among younger age groups, enhancing the appeal of a subculture based on close male ties. In regions that are struggling with marginal subsistence conditions even today, population growth will result in conflicts fought over increasingly limited resources such as water, grazing land, and raw materials. It will trigger migration from the countryside to large cities, from inland areas to coasts, and from coasts to distant continents. Population pressures increase the strains placed on the environment. On the one hand, population growth, combined with economic growth, results in more emissions, erosion, land use, and production of waste. On the other hand, shortterm population pressures impede efforts to respond adequately to long-term environmental change. The result is overgrazing, destruction of valuable ecological areas due to deforestation and desiccation, environmentally harmful methods of extracting natural resources, and so on. If China’s pro-capita consumption of fossil fuel were equivalent to that of the United States, it would consume 120 million barrels of oil a day. Worldwide production currently amounts to 83 million barrels a day. In other words, this level of Chinese consumption would cause worldwide oil supplies to be depleted in 12 years instead of the currently projected 40 years.

6. If birth rates differ between ethnic groups, demographic shifts can result in ethnic tensions. Israel was in part forced to abandon its vision of a Greater Israel comprising the regions of Judaea and Samaria because it recognized that this would inevitably lead to an insoluble dilemma: either it would have had to resort to an increasingly undemocratic, apartheid-like system of government, or it would have had to jeopardize its identity as a Jewish state. This also explains its willingness to implement unilateral withdrawals. In Sri Lanka, differing population developments between the Singhalese and Tamil communities have exacerbated ethnic tensions.

7. Expanding populations will cause megacities to grow at a disproportionate rate and create entirely new problems. Our ability to manage societies will diminish dramatically. We will be virtually unable to meet basic human needs (food, drinking water, waste removal, education) and entire sections of the population will live in misery and form semi-criminal groups existing parallel to mainstream society. In many megacities around the world there is already an explosive blend of lawlessness, despair, violent potential, and revolutionary zeal.

8. If we want to keep antagonisms from worsening, the world’s wealthy, aging, “energy-poor” countries, primarily in Europe, will inevitably have to become more engaged in the young, poor, energy-rich countries. Migration has long ceased to be a national phenomenon; it is even less a matter of domestic policy. Preventative multinational crisis management is the order of the day. This also means that wealthy countries must open their markets to the labor potential and investment opportunities of underdeveloped regions. They must also share their technology. This could mean that aging societies will be increasingly supported by functioning international investments and corresponding financial flows. But an important requirement is that these markets work, that they have a stabilizing effect and are immune to disruptive factors such as targeted terror attacks and the effects of war and conflicts. Perhaps it is time to seriously consider enlarging the G-8. Or maybe the European Union should develop a more ambitious and open policy toward its neighbors. Can voting rights at the World Bank and IMF remain as they are now? Demographic data is of fundamental importance for strategic planning. The rise and fall of nations has always been closely related to population shifts. Globalization is transforming nationally-defined “peoples” into internationally mixed, mobile “populations.” Societies are facing the increasingly complex task of creating coherence and solidarity, defining norms and ethics, and formulating collective (meaning shared, unifying, and binding) rules and goals. Migration cannot be stopped, but it can be controlled. Long-term international efforts should put greater emphasis on the potential and the risks associated with demographic shifts. The more Europe’s population shrinks relative to the world’s population, the less able it will be to assert European values in the global order. Europe will increasingly have to rely on the United States as a “continuation of European policy by other means,” as North American power will most likely continue to expand.

by Rudolf Adam, president of the National Academy for Security Policy in Berlin